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Abstract 
This essay charts the political rise of Frank Hague, Jersey City's infamous mayor from 1917-1947. 
Although most historical attention focuses on his long tenure as mayor, Hague's pre-mayoral career 
provides an instructive example of how urban politicians used public spectacle, the media, ethnic identity, 
and middle class mores to redefine American urban politics.  Before becoming mayor, Hague crafted a 
public persona that appealed to both middle-class and working-class ethnic voters by reinventing himself as 
a Progressive while still retaining the showmanship and personal appeals of machine politics.  Hague 
straddled two distinct political traditions, presenting himself simultaneously as a "pol," rooted in the 
historical mores of the ―Horseshoe,‖ his home neighborhood, as well as a good government advocate, 
appealing to Jersey City's native-born middle class—focusing on clean water, public safety, and personal 
responsibility. In doing so, Hague provided a template for ethnic reform mayors who followed, from 
Fiorello LaGuardia and Richard Daley to Rudolph Giuliani and Ed Rendell. 
 
 
―For better or worse, he knew how to run a show.‖2 
 
Of all the political bosses who ruled the cities of the American East and Midwest at the 
beginning of the twentieth century, perhaps none was as feared, demonized, and beloved 
as Frank Hague of Jersey City, New Jersey (Figure 1). Curiously, however, the man who 
commanded the attention of contemporaries has received scant attention since his 
machine was ―buried‖ with a symbolic funeral in May of 1949.3 
 
Contemporaries and historians describe Hague (1876-1956) as the archetypal American 
political boss. His tenure as mayor from 1917 to 1947 was rarely contested, and his 
power is accurately described by his most famous (if quoted out of context) assertion, ―I 
am the law.‖4 His control of Jersey City‘s police department drew comparisons to Hitler‘s 
Gestapo from contemporary critics. Throughout his career, Hague remained unhesitating 
in his use of political power, political spectacle, and, when necessary, physical violence. 
Both the style and the substance of Hague‘s agenda were innovative. By reinventing 
himself as a Progressive, while retaining the dramatic political flair of machine politics, 
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Hague created an appeal that transcended class and ethnicity. He expanded the reach of 
the Progressive agenda of cleanliness, order, and the curtailing of vice into the ethnic 
working class, who viewed politics as a spectator sport, and introduced the style of Irish-
American politics to Jersey City‘s largely Protestant, native-born middle class, who 
focused on reform and ―good government.‖5 
 
William V. Shannon has suggested that the bosses represented ―a set of political ethics 
and an attitude toward politics and power strikingly different from the native middle class 
code.‖ 6 Over time, Hague developed an approach that appealed to both sets of political 
ethics. By finding issues that could transcend the class and ethnic cultural divide and by 
packaging Progressive reform as bold political spectacle, Hague created a political 
agenda and style that propelled him to leadership and maintained him there for more than 
three decades. Additionally, Hague‘s rise coincided with the zenith of the penny press. 
Hague‘s use of media was masterful, and he knew that any gesture or battle played better 
with a reporter handy. He developed a symbiotic relationship with the press. Even those 
papers, including the Hudson Observer, that were hostile to him, understood that 
covering Hague sold papers, and Hague understood that even negative press kept his face 
and his agenda in front of voters. 
 
The significance of Hague‘s rough-and-tumble Progressivism extends well beyond the 
confines of Jersey City, as he marked the creation of a lasting and lastingly important 
archetype of urban politics. From his own era, in the likes of Fiorello LaGuardia and Al 
Smith across the Hudson, to more recent ethnic reform mayors such as Boston‘s Ray 
Flynn and New York‘s Rudolph Giuliani, Hague‘s early career serves as a template for 
how to fuse a reform agenda aimed at middle-class morality to the political showmanship 
and credibility of ethnic political style. Scholarship focusing on Hague is limited, 
particularly that which deals with his pre-mayoral career.
7
 Most often journalists have 
used Hague‘s long and powerful tenure as mayor as an object lesson about the evils of 
bossism.
8
 If Hague himself has not been adequately examined, however, the larger 
phenomenon of bossism and machine politics is well-worn historiographic terrain. 
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Figure 1. Frank Hague, ca. 1920. Reproduction Number: LC-USZ62-119504, Library of Congress Prints 
and Photographs Division Washington, D.C.  
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As the debate passed from Progressive reformers of the 1910s to historians and political 
scientists in the 1960s and 1970s, the role of the boss himself became curiously 
diminished in historical accounts. Though Harold Zink‘s 1930 City Bosses in the United 
States attempted to discuss the personality of the boss and to muse whether or not a 
―typical‖ boss can be described, historians since Zink have placed the boss in the 
background in favor of political science and sociological models geared to explain the 
creation and remarkable durability of the machines. Model-builders have depicted the 
machine as everything from a despotic entity preying on immigrants as a means of 
preserving its conservative agenda, to a form of extralegal socialism bent on the 
redistribution of wealth along ethnic lines.
9
 
 
Although the specific details of their proposed models vary, political scientists and 
sociologists have gravitated toward a focus on the tangible rewards bosses offered their 
followers. By ignoring the charisma of the boss as a central force in the machine‘s 
appeals to voters, scholars marginalize the role of the boss in the creation and 
maintenance of the machine. Though these material factors are of indisputable 
significance, they do not help to explain why it was Frank Hague and not another poor 
boy from Jersey City who was able to consolidate the power of the city (and in many 
cases even state and federal) government entirely within his personal control. 
 
Historians have begun to describe the cultural role of the political rallies and street fairs, 
but not explicitly their significance in supporting bosses and machines.
10
 Though he 
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spoke of an earlier era, Michael McGerr was particularly clear in his understanding of the 
complex connections between the politician and the voters played out on the bunting-
trimmed stage of the political rally. ―Spectacle… became an intricate dance of 
accommodation between the candidate and the people,‖11 insisted McGerr, speaking of 
the political pageantry of the mid-nineteenth century, and this description applies even 
more strongly to the local elections for which bosses and their candidates promoted 
themselves. The primacy of local elections demanded significantly more visibility and 
availability of local politicians than it did of presidential candidates during the era of 
―front-porch‖ campaigns when candidates rarely if ever, appeared in public. The intricate 
dance McGerr described grows increasingly complex in the close quarters of the urban 
municipal setting, where politician and voter remain in close contact. 
 
Adapting McGerr‘s analysis to take into account not only the spectacle but also the 
underlying ethical framework it represented makes it possible to understand Hague‘s 
ability to build a coalition encompassing both rank-and-file machine Democrats and 
Progressives by his use of the drama of street rallies and torchlight parades. To 
understand the development of Hague‘s political style it is instructive to look at the 
period during which that style took shape. During the early portion of his career, before 
he became mayor in 1917, Frank Hague honed his political showmanship. The massive 
parades through Journal Square during his later reign can best be understood by 
examining the more modest ones in Jersey City‘s Second Ward before the turn of the 
century. 
 
Hague‘s early career can be divided into two phases. The period before 1908 found 
Hague in the role of the traditional ―pol,‖ a loyal machine worker and political ringmaster 
working within the ethical and cultural ideology of his immigrant ward. However, 
beginning after his 1908 appointment to the position of City Hall Custodian (Figure 2), 
and blooming fully by his 1913 support for the installation of commission government 
for Jersey City, Hague reinvented himself as a reformer and a Progressive, appealing to 
middle-class ethics favoring ―good government‖ and a depoliticized civil service. 
Insisting that Hague was not in fact a true Progressive, many scholars have suggested that 
he merely aped a Wilsonian agenda as a means of copying the governor‘s meteoric 
political rise.
12
 Others, in an attempt to rehabilitate Hague‘s historical image, have hailed 
him as a genuine reformer at least in the mid-1910s.
13
 In fact, Hague‘s Progressive turn 
was a series of complex cultural and political events. 
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Figure 2. City Hall, Jersey City, New Jersey. Courtesy Jersey City Free Public Library 
 
 
Haig and the Horseshoe 
 
Frank Hague first began to develop his political style in the small neighborhood by Jersey 
City‘s waterfront known as the Horseshoe, a working-class enclave of Irish, German and 
Italian immigrants and first-generation Americans.
14
 Hague was the second of eight 
children born to John Hague, a blacksmith and security guard, and his wife Margaret. 
Both had come to Jersey City from County Cavan, Ireland. Growing up in the Horseshoe 
section where, as one contemporary journalist put it, ―politics and political strife are 
enjoyed as much as a square meal,‖15 Hague embodied a political ethic built on 
entertainment as a key element in the politician‘s public appeal. Often the political 
content was secondary to the entertainments. As one account of a 1907 rally complained, 
―The shouts for this candidate or that one were so deafening that it was impossible for the 
dancers to keep time with the music of the orchestra.‖16 Later, after Hague‘s self-
reinvention as a progressive, this entertainment-oriented political tradition remained a 
central part of his approach. 
 
But ―Shoe‖ politics were not merely a spectacle, devoid of content. Rather, the Horseshoe 
paraded its political ethics through the streets in election campaigns. Such slogans as 
―THE HORSESHOE AGAINST THE WORLD,‘ and ―THE HORSESHOE TAKES 
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CARE OF ITS OWN,‖17 reinforced the values of loyalty and neighborhood. In contrast to 
reformers‘ demands for a depoliticized civil service where personal relationships and 
loyalties wouldn‘t sway officials in their execution of duty, Horseshoe residents expected 
that their political loyalty would be matched by the loyalty of their leaders – a loyalty 
repaid in the form of jobs and favors. Hague carefully maintained his credibility within 
the ‗Shoe‘s value structure while he simultaneously made an appeal to the reformers‘ 
sensibilities. 
 
Little concrete information on Hague‘s early years survives, and much that is available 
bears the scars of the ideological and political agendas of its authors. J. Owen Grundy 
complained that most of the major work on Hague has been ―journalistic and sketchy,‖18 
an observation that seems especially true for his earliest years. Both Hague apologists and 
those attacking his record have made much of Hague‘s impoverished childhood. 
Supporters have described Hague‘s early travails much like a Horatio Alger tale; writers 
such as McKean have used it to psychologize Hague and to explain the ―sinister‖ 
elements of his personality. In a 1940 exposé, Saturday Evening Post was even more 
blunt, describing Hague as a ―mug‖ and beginning its article by pointing out that Hague 
had been ―expelled from sixth grade as a truant and a dullard.‖19 Hague himself took an 
active part in mythologizing his youth, and, as McKean has noted, ―A favorite theme for 
speeches to political audiences is to recount in detail the story of his rise… he frequently 
alludes to his wild youth and to the narrowness of the margin by which he escaped being 
led into a life of crime.‖20 
 
Whatever Hague‘s specific psychological baggage, his childhood was a training ground 
for his later political career. While McKean attributes Hague‘s political savvy to ―that 
political sense that his nationality seems generally to possess,‖21 it seems clear that he 
learned it on the streets and in the saloons of Jersey City‘s Horseshoe neighborhood 
during his youth. His scholastic career ended in 1889 when he was dismissed from school 
as incorrigible, after less than a sixth-grade education.
22
 With newfound time to spend 
with political notables in Horseshoe saloons, Hague‘s political education was underway. 
 
The political life of the Horseshoe during the late nineteenth century took place in 
saloons, and the tiny neighborhood boasted forty of them during Hague‘s youth. Though 
a lifelong nondrinker, Hague frequented saloons in his youth as a means of keeping up on 
the political news of the neighborhood.
23
 Although only one source links Hague with a 
specific gang,
24
 two of his older brothers were members of the ―Red Tigers.‖25 Hague, 
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who was large and athletic, received some of his earliest political jobs as a poll-side 
tough, placed strategically to ―encourage‖ voters to favor a specific candidate in the days 
before secret balloting. Hague‘s ―considerable skill as a boxer‖26 made him attractive to 
local political figures, who began to take note of the flashily dressed teenager. 
 
 
Figure 3: Frank Hague, his wife, and son, Frank, Jr., 1925. Reproduction Number: LC-USZ62-119553. 
Library of Congress Prints and Photographs Division Washington, D.C. 
 
In a political culture defined by dramatic public presentations, young Frank Hague 
became a notable figure. His size and bearing made him a natural standout; his high-
toned fashion made him more so. Even before his political career began in earnest, he 
was known around the neighborhood. Hague‘s dramatic dress – which stayed with him 
throughout his life – may not have been, for him, solely a tool of self-promotion. It is 
clear that he was intent on building a public name to help achieve his political aspirations, 
and his sartorial style helped mark him as a ―sharp‖ (Figure 3).27 
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Constable Hague 
 
Frank Hague‘s political career began in 1896 when local saloon keeper Nat Kenny chose 
him as a candidate for constable. Kenny began struggling for power in the Horseshoe 
with the aging boss of Hudson County, Dennis ―Denny the Mick‖ McLaughlin, and his 
young protégé, Bob Davis. To punish the upstart Kenny, McLaughlin opened the Park 
House, a lavish saloon down the street from Kenny‘s own tavern and political 
headquarters. The rivalry continued, and eventually the torchlight parades sponsored by 
each saloonkeeper to drum up business grew violent. Davis, now the acting boss, stepped 
in to try to halt the feud between McLaughlin and Kenny. As a peacekeeping symbol, 
Davis sought to persuade the two warring parties to agree on a ticket for the upcoming 
constabulary elections. Davis‘s peacekeeping mission failed, however. Kenny staked 
Hague with seventy-five dollars with which to ―make friends‖28 and installed the twenty-
one-year-old as candidate for constable, over the objections of Davis and his machine.
29
 
 
Hague made the most of this opportunity by building a coalition of support ranging from 
local bookie Charles ―Goodey‖ Goode to local clergyman Monsignor Sheppard, both of 
whom remained Hague supporters for years.
30
 Thus, from his first election, Hague sought 
and received support from both the visible and invisible power bases in the community. 
Hague attacked the character of Davis‘s and McLaughlin‘s candidate in the primary, a 
local tough named ―King‖ Callahan,31 and quickly drew support to his own candidacy. 
 
Once he beat Callahan, Hague‘s success in the general election was assured, and he 
defeated the Republican opposition soundly. Hague moved to make himself appear a 
natural leader and began hosting political events in support of party candidates.
32
 The 
unpaid constable position held many advantages for the ambitious Hague. His duty as a 
poll-watcher on election day made him particularly useful to party officials who wanted 
events to run smoothly at the ballot box. His responsibility to escort prisoners to the 
penitentiary at Trenton presented an opportunity to cement friendships and to prove his 
largess by providing a final pre-prison supper for his felonious friends.
33
 
 
Hague‘s resistance to the constable‘s uniform, which reportedly resembled that of a 
trolley conductor, offers a significant insight into his early image-building.
34
 He 
eschewed the uniform whenever possible in order to maintain his developing image as a 
leader. 
 
Taking note of Hague‘s following and growing numbers of favorable press clippings, 
Davis moved to bring him into the machine‘s fold. Although nominally an anti-machine 
candidate backed by Kenny, not Davis, Constable Hague found himself at home in the 
                                                 
28
 McKean, The Boss, 29. 
29
 Leach, ―The War of the Beer Barrels‖ (unpublished manuscript), Jersey City Historical Project 
Collection; Foster ―Frank Hague of Jersey City,‖ 8; McKean, The Boss, 27-30 
30
 Leach, ―War of the Beer Barrels,‖ 5. 
31
 Ibid., 4. 
32
 Foster, ―Frank Hague of Jersey City,‖ 9. 
33
 Leach, ―War of the Beer Barrels,‖ 5. 
34
 Ibid. 
Raffety 
  38       
political climate around him. Little separated him from the other members of Davis‘s 
machine, apart from his aggressiveness and energy. At this stage in his career, Hague was 
the classic machine pol, solidifying his position as the man to see about a job or problem 
with the police. His efficient work as constable and as one of Davis‘s key men in the 
district earned Hague an appointment as deputy sheriff two years later. 
 
Hague received his first major political setback in late 1904, when he became caught 
between two competing loyalties. Thomas ―Red‖ Dugan, a local Horseshoe ne‘er-do-well 
and Hague childhood friend, was arrested for forgery in Boston. Deputy Sheriff Hague 
was subpoenaed to appear in court in New Jersey on the day of Dugan‘s trial in Boston. 
In a legendary impassioned plea, Dugan‘s mother prevailed upon Hague to go to Boston, 
where he testified that, although he could not be certain, he believed he had seen Dugan 
in a park in Jersey City on the day of the crime.
35
 
 
At first, Hague‘s trip to Boston remained a secret, and only his failure to appear in court 
in Jersey was noted in an article buried ten pages into the Hudson Dispatch.
36
 The 
Dispatch‘s piece was enough to cause problems, however, and two weeks later the Jersey 
Journal reported that Hague had been fined one hundred dollars and dismissed from the 
constabulary.
37
 
 
Although the scandal forced Davis to dismiss Hague from his position as ward leader, 
Hague‘s credibility within the Horseshoe was high. According to Robert Leach, Hague 
had ―gained the everlasting respect of many residents in the Shoe. Here was a man who 
would stand up for one of his own.‖38  
 
Rather than burying the scandal, Hague reveled in it. Dugan‘s mother, whose tearful 
entreaty had convinced Hague that his duty to a friend outweighed his duty to the court, 
routinely appeared by Hague‘s side at campaign rallies.39 Hague‘s trip to Boston was 
within the ethical order of the ward that in Hague‘s youth had proclaimed loudly, ―THE 
HORSESHOE TAKES CARE OF ITS OWN.‖40 It was not until 1911, after Hague had 
begun to remake himself into a Progressive, that the Red Dugan incident would become a 
significant liability. 
 
The following year, Davis rewarded Hague with a position on the county‘s Democratic 
nominating committee, thus placing Hague among the elite power brokers in Hudson 
County. Hague also sought and won re-election as constable.
41
 By 1907, Hague, now 
sergeant-at-arms for the state Assembly, had returned as leader of the second ward.
42
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By 1908, however, Hague was caught between two warring factions in the Democratic 
machine. Hague backed Otto H. Wittpenn (Figure 4) for mayor, despite Davis‘s 
ambivalence. After Wittpenn‘s election, Hague‘s efforts were rewarded with the position 
of chief custodian of city hall over the objections of Davis who had another candidate in 
mind for the position (which paid a sizeable two thousand dollars a year). As custodian, 
Hague had the authority to hire the sizable maintenance staff for city hall, thus affording 
him new opportunities to dole out patronage jobs. It also gave him a front-row seat in city 
hall to all of the political goings-on. 
 
Hague‘s new position increased both the cash in his pocket and the patronage at his 
disposal, but he found himself in the midst of the ensuing feud between Kenny and the 
new mayor. In an attempt to retain his alliance with both men, Hague claimed fealty to all 
sides: ―I shall be loyal to Robert Davis‖, he insisted in an interview with the Jersey 
Journal; ―I shall gladly fight under Davis‘s leadership and of course I shall never forget 
the obligations I am under to mayor Wittpenn, whose firm friend I shall continue to be.‖43 
His attempt was unsuccessful, and after a bitter ward fight, Davis disciplined Hague by 
removing him from his position as ward leader once again. 
 
―Friendship‖ and ―obligation,‖ both central tenets of the machine ethical order, became 
increasingly problematic for Hague as custodian. Once within city hall, Hague began to 
remake himself from constituent-minded ward pol to civic-minded city employee. Just as 
he began to promote himself as a reformer in favor of ―good government,‖ he came under 
fire from Davis and those back home in the ‗Shoe. During the fight in which he lost 
control of the Second Ward Tammany Club, Davis‘s men accused Hague of not living up 
to his ethical duties to support his followers. Peter P. Murphy, one of the Democratic 
faithful, accused Hague of forgetting his roots and first loyalties: ―He has not stood well 
with the Irish-Americans,‖ Murphy insisted. 44  
 
The Hudson Observer made a similar claim, suggesting that Hague ―has not looked out 
for men in the Second Ward when it came time for the distribution of ‗plums‘ … but 
instead for his own interests.‖45 Although the specifics of the claim, coming as they did 
from Davis supporters, may have been more political rhetoric than genuine complaint, the 
form such attacks took is significant. Detractors challenged Hague‘s loyalty to his 
supporters and claimed he was selfish – unforgivable sins in the ‗Shoe. 
The custodianship of city hall would seem to have been a far more valuable job in terms 
of patronage dispensation than in terms of potential publicity, but Frank Hague found a 
way to get both from his new job. In addition to the nearly one hundred positions on the 
city payroll now at his disposal, Hague drew plaudits for his energetic attention to his 
duties. Within two weeks of his installation on January 1, 1908, local papers praised the 
cleanliness of the city hall under Hague‘s supervision.46 This reputation for diligence 
would prove a critical building block for his later reinvention as a crusading Progressive, 
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and would distance him further from the older ethical order of ―Red‖ Dugan and 
company. 
 
 
Figure 4. H. Otto Wittpenn, circa 1907. Courtesy Jersey City Free Public Library.  
 
Hague began to take on reform causes beyond his specific duties at city hall. He spoke 
against the use of dirty-burning ―soft coal‖ by the railroads whose tracks crisscrossed the 
Horseshoe (Figure 5).
47
 While Hague remained focused primarily on the Horseshoe and 
its residents, he expanded his crusading to encompass all of Jersey City. 
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Hague‘s transformation into responsible civil servant was far from complete, however, as 
an altercation between Hague and a co-worker illustrates: ―before the row was over,‖ the 
Jersey Journal observed, ―Hague had landed his fist in Hart‘s face, and the war of words 
had attracted a crowd.‖48 If Hague took a lesson from this incident, it was that the war of 
words had attracted the attention. 
 
From 1908 forward, Hague took an aggressive position in conflicts with other leaders. 
Davis attempted to discipline both Hague and Wittpenn by removing Hague as ward 
leader and derided Hague‘s work at city hall, but Hague was not cowed by the county 
leader. Instead, he used the press both to assert his independence and to support his 
record. ―The fact is that since I became City Hall Custodian under Mayor Wittpenn on 
Jan. 1, I have been complimented repeatedly on the way I am keeping City Hall in order,‖ 
he told the Jersey Journal. ―I am going to go right on doing my duty. Davis‘s attack will 
not deter me.‖ 49 
 
 
Figure 5. Jersey City‘s Second Ward (detail). Plate 12 from the Plat book of Jersey City 1928. Source: 
Rutgers University Special Collections and University Archives.  
 
 
Although Davis was still too powerful to attack directly, Hague showed little restraint in 
assailing Davis‘s choice for his replacement as ward leader, John Sheehy. Hague taunted 
Sheehy publicly, asking, ―Has all the fight in Sheehy gone out of him? I hoped for real 
excitement…. We would have made this ante-primary fight one of the most interesting in 
Jersey City‘s history.‖50 Significantly, Hague promised the ‗Shoe residents first and 
foremost a good show, and as Sheehy supporter James Hennessy complained, ―Hague is 
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playing to the galleries.‖51 As Hague was fast learning, these galleries were his key to 
success. 
 
Once Sheehy finally secured control of the Tammany Club, Hague‘s response was to 
splinter its membership by forming a separate organization, the ―Tammanee Club,‖52 
thereby prolonging the fight off and on for several years. Hague held onto the city hall 
position but lost control of the ward. In addition to his fight with Sheehy, a rift developed 
between Wittpenn and Hague in 1911. After Davis‘s death that year, Jersey City 
Democrats found themselves in disarray. Hague coveted Davis‘s position as city 
collector, but, in order to promote unity, Wittpenn installed one of Davis‘s former 
lieutenants.
53
 
 
 
Progressive Agenda/Personal Politics 
 
Hague‘s repackaging of himself as a Progressive was far from complete by 1911. He 
came out strongly against commission government and against Wittpenn in that year‘s 
mayoral election.
54
 The Walsh Act of 1911 permitted a municipality to hold a referendum 
to reorganize its government into a small but powerful board of commissioners, each 
responsible for a specific aspect of city government.
55
 Progressive-minded middle-class 
observers such as the editors of the Jersey Journal saw commission government as a way 
of breaking the electoral power of ethnic ward leaders. Beyond its tactical political value, 
the rationalization of government under commissioners with precisely defined 
responsibilities came to be seen as a panacea for all of the city‘s ills.56 Although Hague 
returned to the fold in time for the mayoral election, securing Wittpenn‘s support for his 
run for a seat on the street and water board, it was only after the talk of commission 
government had been silenced.
57
 
 
Hague‘s first citywide election was a hard fight. A different set of political rules applied 
in the larger arena, rules Hague was still learning. On October 12, 1911 the ―Red‖ Dugan 
incident returned to plague him when George L. Record, a crusading Republican, 
attacked Hague, and by association Wittpenn, in a speech revisiting all the details of 
Hague‘s 1904 trip to Boston. This time, Hague could not turn a scandal into political 
capital. As a candidate for the street and water board, arguing in his own speeches for a 
Progressive agenda, Hague had to play to a wider audience than the Horseshoe faithful, 
an audience less likely to be moved by the tears of Dugan‘s mother. 
 
Record‘s nightly attacks continued in speeches throughout Jersey City, and, unlike 1904, 
the public did not seem to tire of the issue. Dugan‘s trial, and Hague‘s role in it, captured 
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considerably more newspaper ink in 1911 that it had in 1904 – with no new information 
coming to light. By his own admission, Record had cribbed his speeches from the 1904 
Journal articles, which the paper reprinted alongside the new coverage. The Journal went 
so far as to send a reporter to Boston to try to obtain a transcript of Hague‘s testimony.58  
 
Hague eventually prevailed in the election, but ―Red‖ Dugan remained a political liability 
for Hague outside the Horseshoe for the remainder of his pre-mayoral career. In addition 
to the return of Dugan, charges of previous election irregularities plagued Hague.
59
 
Although he was eventually cleared, the scandal further damaged his growing image as a 
Progressive candidate. 
 
In the midst of the scandals, Hague tried to outline his new Progressive agenda. Replying 
to an open letter to candidates by the Eight Ward Civic League, an ―improvers‖ group, 
Hague insisted, ―The Street and Water Board needs Progressive men, men whose 
backbones are not of the jelly-fish order, men who will fight the people‘s fight.‖60 If 
Jersey City residents remained skeptical about Hague‘s transformation, they at least 
offered him the opportunity to prove himself by electing him to the board. Even if they 
had shown him support in the election, however, Hague had yet to convince Jersey City‘s 
Progressives that he was one of their own. Referring to the condition of the streets, 
George Prigge of the Twelfth Ward Improvement Association warned, ―It is up to Mr. 
Hague to prove that he intends to make some moves on the matter.‖61 Hague moved 
quickly and publicly to live up to Prigge‘s hopes. 
 
Hague racked up column inches in the Jersey Journal after winning his place on the 
street and water board and remodeling what had been a sleepy post into a headline 
generator, much as he had done as custodian. Four days after taking office, Hague, the 
junior member of the five-man board, went to the press with a communication he had 
sent to Police Chief Monahan demanding improved police enforcement of litter laws.
62
 
 
No matter how theoretical the issue, Hague found a way to make it personal: litter wasn‘t 
the problem; Monahan was. Similarly, when Hague and the rest of the board argued over 
the details of a deal to supply water to neighboring Bayonne, Hague attacked Wittpenn 
by dramatizing meetings as scenarios where he stood bravely alone against four Wittpenn 
lackeys.
63
 When Wittpenn attacked Hague, he did not do so on his failings as a reformer; 
instead, the mayor took Hague to task for his lack of loyalty and discipline to the party 
machine. At one meeting a Wittpennite accused Hague of having ―‘thrown down‘ the 
Mayor after receiving favors from him.‖64 This time, the rift between Hague and 
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Wittpenn proved permanent. The ―Water Snake,‖ as the press dubbed the Bayonne water 
scandal, proved the breaking point in the Hague-Wittpenn alliance.
65
 
 
Hague enhanced both his Progressive image and his public visibility by using the Water 
Snake to demand that all city board meetings should be made public on the grounds that 
doing so would afford a higher level of accountability for city officials.
66
 Not only did 
this demand for transparency in the workings of government mirror Progressive 
demands; it also afforded Hague a wider stage for his own use. On occasions where he 
could not secure a public meeting, Hague simply reiterated its content to the press. 
Hague‘s demand for public accountability and his attack of the Bayonne water deal had 
considerable effect; even the Republicans grudgingly praised him.
67
  
 
Hague also began to focus publicly on women and protection of the family, a position 
that had cross-class appeal. Speeches to women‘s clubs became a regular event during his 
time on the board, and the protection of women and families became a common trope in 
his public appearances.
68
 
 
While incorporating the middle-class‘ Progressive agenda, Hague did not distance 
himself from his own class and ethnic origins. Instead, he built his poor and troubled 
childhood into a narrative of self-uplift that read both as a celebration of his origins and a 
celebration of his new identity as respected civil servant. A writer for the Jersey Journal 
summarized Hague‘s public presentation of himself as he reported on a speech Hague 
gave before the Salvation Army on ―The Uplift of Mankind.‖ ―To cultivate a strong 
willpower was the essential thing to success, Mr. Hague said and he set himself up as a 
model of a man who, although beset on every side by difficulties in his climb up the 
latter, was urged on to greater things, even by defeat.‖ 69 Similarly, his devout 
Catholicism helped appeal to both groups. His devotion to the Catholic Church illustrated 
to his old constituents that he remained one of them. Although the middle class might 
have preferred Methodism, it could find no fault with the seriousness with which Hague 
professed his faith. 
 
Hague remained a political innovator. Even within the rubric of entertainment politics, he 
sought new ways to appeal to voters. He began increasing the draw to his rallies by 
showing outdoor movies.
70
 By incorporating the new technology into the older system of 
politicking, Hague ensure that his rallies remained fresh and exciting in comparison to 
others in the Horseshoe. 
 
  
Frank Hague vs. Woodrow Wilson 
  
                                                 
65
 ―Hague, Single Handed, Tackles ‗Water Snake.‘‖ 
66
 ―No Secret Sessions for Hague,‖ Jersey Journal, January 25, 1912. 
67
 ―Republicans Almost Endorse Frank Hague,‖ Jersey Journal, January 30, 1912. 
68
 ―Hague Talks to Women About Dirty Streets,‖ Jersey Journal, February 27, 1912; ―Hague Hampered by 
‗Old and Incompetent Men,‘‖ Jersey Journal, February 28, 1912. 
69
 ―Frank Hague S.A. Speaker,‖ Jersey Journal, March 19, 1913. 
70
 Foster, ―Early Career‘‖ 50. 
New Jersey History 124:1 
 
   45 
From the Progressive point of view, Hague took a serious misstep in April of 1912, when 
he backed Essex County boss James T. Smith in the latter‘s effort to block the 
presidential nomination of Governor Woodrow Wilson. Rejoining the Davis machine, 
Hague attacked Wilson for disloyalty to the Democratic Party and for failure to look after 
the interests of Hudson County Democrats.
71
 Wittpenn, who hoped that a Wilson 
presidency would promote his own gubernatorial hopes, accused Hague of becoming a 
tool of the neighboring Essex County machine.
72
 In retribution for his disloyalty, the city 
payroll began to hemorrhage Hague‘s friends, including his brother.73  
 
Hague fought hard against Wilson. In an ugly dispute at the state nominating committee, 
each side accused the other of double-dealing and fraud. By the end of the convention, 
Wilson had received the support of New Jersey‘s delegates to the national convention 
over Hague‘s strenuous objections. Even though he reversed himself and supported 
Wilson in the national election, Hague had made a powerful permanent enemy in Wilson 
and had again damaged his public image as a Progressive.
74
 
 
Hague battled the political damage to his Progressive credentials from his anti-Wilson 
activities as he had the return of the ―Red‖ Dugan fiasco – by redoubling his Progressive 
activities. After a year on the street and water board, Hague announced himself as a true 
Progressive. He insisted that his fights with Wittpenn and his cronies on the board had 
convinced him to support a change to commission government.
75
 The Jersey Journal, 
traditionally hostile to him, reversed itself and celebrated Hague‘s ―conversion.‖ 76 
 
Hague took an increasingly active hand in his media portrayal. He often guided the text 
of newspaper accounts by sending open letters to the paper. During the campaigning for 
commission government in 1913, the Hague campaign committee delivered the press 
releases directly to the papers. Disturbed by the vilification he suffered at the hands of the 
editor of the Hudson Observer, Hague purchased ads in the paper calling for ―fair play 
and [a] square deal,‖ and supplied side-by-side comparisons between the Observer’s and 
the Journal’s campaign coverage.77 
 
Assertions of his own independent-minded manhood – and accusations of others‘ 
cowardice – abounded in Hague‘s rhetoric. ―I wear no man‘s collar. I think and act for 
myself, in accordance with the wishes of the people,‖ insisted Hague.78 He responded to 
Wittpenn‘s vague accusations by challenging the mayor to a public debate:  
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He is cowardly to run away and refuse to face the test after he has in one of his 
little ward club meetings where he was among friends and he knew that his 
remarks would be published in the newspapers and reach a larger audience, made 
the assertion that he would tell something on me that would silence me. I have 
dared him to meet me before all the people who can be crowded into the large 
auditorium of the High School and there tell the thing which he says will put me 
out of business as a candidate. He is a coward to be afraid to face me and say it to 
my face and he is not a good citizen if he knows anything to my discredit and fails 
to make it public for the information of the voters.
79
 
 
The more he transformed himself into a political brawler, the more Hague tapped into a 
key source of pride for the Irish community. Hague turned the amateur boxing of his 
youth into political sparring against his opponents, with increasing viciousness. At times 
Hague‘s challenges seemed to echo world heavyweight champion and Irish-American 
folk hero John L. Sullivan‘s famous bray, ―I‘ll lick any son of a bitch alive!‖80 In one 
such instance, Hague promised to take on the entire Wittpenn administration in debate: ―I 
don‘t blame the Mayor for wanting to beat me; he is afraid I will expose his schemes 
against the people… Let me tell you Hague will not be beaten. I invite the opposition of 
the Mayor and the members of his administration who follow him blindly.‖81 
 
Hague continued to hammer at Wittpenn‘s manhood by deriding the way he campaigned: 
―If he proposes to resort to the desperate tactics which he is accustomed to [sic] and 
trying to injure me by vague innuendoes and dastardly insinuations not based upon facts, 
which has been his method of fighting in the past, the people will understand why he is 
too cowardly to meet me in a public debate in which I have everything and he nothing to 
lose.‖82 With one comment, Wittpenn found his character attacked in the framework of 
both classes‘ ethical structures. Calling Wittpenn a coward struck at the very heart of the 
value system of ethnic neighborhoods like the ‗Shoe. However, the assertion of ―vague 
innuendoes and dastardly insinuations‖ spoke to a middle class for whom character was 
critical.
83
 
 
The new Progressive Hague may have changed his rhetoric, but he had not changed his 
rhetorical style. As the 1913 commission government campaign thrust him into the 
foreground both within the Horseshoe and without, Hague honed his knack for vicious 
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attack. The Jersey Journal cited one old-time Horseshoe resident who said the 1913 
campaign for commission government ―looked like old times.‖84 
 
Even Hague‘s grammar illustrates his complicated cross-class identification by 
combining the erudite vocabulary of the middle class with the rough linguistic edges of 
his working-class origins. According to McKean, ―His speech is curious. He pronounces 
words correctly and uses them fluently and accurately – in his ambitious youth he took 
lessons in public speaking – but the plural form of verbs hardly exists for him.‖85 
 
Not all observers were as enamored with the new Hague as the Jersey Journal. The 
Hudson Observer warned of ―schemes that lurk in commission government‖86 and 
suggested that his push for commission government was little more than a grasp for 
power, not the outgrowth of a reformist impulse. The Observer became more stridently 
anti-Hague as the election approached. In the midst of the paper‘s election eve editorial, 
the editors asserted – in boldface and all capitals – that ―THOUGHTFUL VOTERS 
WILL EXCLUDE HAGUE FROM CONSIDERATION. HE IS A NOISY SHIFTY 
PARTISAN WHO HAS GONE THROUGH THE CAMPAIGN FALSIFYING 
RECORDS AND VILIFYING MUCH BETTER MEN THAN HIMSELF.‖87 
 
But was the Observer right about Hague‘s dark intentions? If Hague was not a true 
convert to Progressivism, he was certainly active in support of his new agenda and spoke 
out against many of the Progressives‘ favorite targets. In 1967, historian Mark Foster 
pointed out that between 1913 and 1917 Hague ―attacked, among other things, railroads; 
the insurance trust; food retailers; the local gas, water and streetcar companies; building 
contractors; movie theaters; houses of prostitution; narcotics and war profiteering.‖88 
Both Foster and George Rapport have argued that Hague learned a political lesson from 
Wilson‘s success and repackaged himself as a Progressive by 1913. Although Foster was 
less sure, Rapport insisted that Hague simply co-opted Progressive language for his own 
political glory.
89
 Whether he truly had Progressivism in his heart or not, Hague‘s shift 
from pol to Progressive marked a new direction for his political persona.
90
 
 
Significantly, opponents of Hague felt it necessary to attack him as a campaigner as well 
as a candidate. The Hudson Observer published several derisive articles ridiculing 
Hague‘s ability to draw and keep a crowd.91 In one attack the Observer noted, ―Numbers 
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of people took one look at Hague and, with heads bowed, silently walked away… The 
throng of listeners, all of them perfectly respectable and law abiding citizens, melted 
away like winter snows under the warmth of a summer sun – away toward the north, 
away to the south, the east and the west they went, never more to return. An ancient 
Egyptian would have recalled the exodus of the Hebrews from his native land.‖92 
Contrast this description to the Journal‘s reports of ―Hot Political Night[s]‖ and ―fiery‖93 
speeches by Hague, and it is clear that the both papers understood the political 
importance of an audience‘s reaction.  
 
Accusations of bossism flew back and forth between Hague and Wittpenn. Wittpenn 
sought to portray Hague as still a machine shill, this time the lackey of Newark‘s boss, 
James T. Smith, whom Hague had supported in an unsuccessful bid to block Wilson‘s 
presidential nomination. Hague compromised his image as a Progressive by failing to 
support Wilson in 1912, and in both 1913 elections Wittpenn rarely failed to mention that 
fact. Although he tried to denounce Hague as a demagogue, Wittpenn found himself 
compelled to answer Hague‘s attacks, thus forcing the language of the campaign into 
Hague‘s terms.94 Once Wittpenn referred to his candidates as ―for want of a better 
designation [those who] were known as the organization candidates‖95 Hague‘s charges 
of bossism were all but confirmed. 
 
Hague made political capital out of the mayor‘s having identified a slate of candidates for 
the commission. Using the campaign slogan ―The Unbossed‖ in ads, he took Wittpenn‘s 
―bracketed‖ candidates as evidence of an attempt to control the election and continue 
Wittpenn‘s reign.96 Supporting Hague‘s attack, Vicar-General John A. Sheppard decried 
bracketed candidates ―who acknowledge the call-up whistle of a boss.‖97 Again, Hague 
appealed across class lines, linking the middle-class fear of bossism to the working-class 
disdain for not being ―your own man.‖ 
 
Hague‘s attacks against his former patron were outside the bounds of the older Horseshoe 
notions of political loyalty. He justified this breech of the ethical code of personal and 
party loyalty by insisting that Wittpenn had violated a higher trust. ―If I am a traitor to 
Mayor Wittpenn, it is because Mayor Wittpenn is a traitor to the people of Jersey City…. 
He says I betrayed him. Maybe I did, but in betraying him I was loyal to the people who 
had elected me.‖ 98 In this attack, Hague asserted his loyalty to the ―people of Jersey 
City‖ – a broader echo of the old ―Horseshoe against the world‖ ideology – while he 
appealed to Progressives with the suggestion that he was above mere politics and was 
instead driven by a more noble dedication to the citizenry. 
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Not Doing “As Others Have Done” 
 
In the June election Hague received the second-highest vote total. With the defeat of four 
of five Wittpenn candidates, Hague catapulted to a position of power he had not 
previously enjoyed. Rather than promoting himself for mayor, however, Hague and the 
other commissioners appointed Michael Fagin, a reform Republican, to the mayoralty as 
an illustration of their nonpartisan ideology of civic government. Hague sought for 
himself the position of director of public safety, with control over both the police and fire 
departments. If Hague found ways to turn the custodianship and a seat on the street and 
water board into publicity, public safety gave him unparalleled opportunities to position 
himself in the public eye. According to Senator Joseph Tumulty, ―This was his real 
source of power, his control of the Department of Public Safety.‖ 99 
 
Enhanced publicity permitted Hague to continue building his record as a Progressive. He 
insisted on rational, disciplined police and fire departments and warned that political 
favors, the primary political currency of the old order, would no longer be of value. 
 
Hague announced his new ethical order: ―The time has passed when it will be possible 
for you to go and see a politician and get away with violations of the law. I am not going 
to do as others have done.‖ 100 No longer, insisted Hague, would personal loyalty 
outweigh the commonweal, a dramatic statement from a former protégé of Bob Davis. 
Once the new commissioner began to purge both the fire and police departments of 
loafers and drunkards with sound political connections, however, his reforms came to 
represent an overthrow of the political ethics, that had, until that point, ruled both Hague 
and much of Jersey City. Hague accomplished this change without destroying his most 
basic – and most critical – base of support in the Horseshoe by dramatizing and 
personalizing each battle he fought in order to make it comprehensible in terms of the 
ethical tenets of the ethnic working class. 
 
Hague centralized police control under his direct supervision. Citing a failure of officers 
to patrol their beats up to ―one hundred per cent duty,‖ he instituted a roaming squad of 
senior officers to ensure that the rank and file patrolled diligently.
101
 Eventually, this 
squad developed into the ―Zeps,‖ an elite core of officers directly under his control. The 
―Zeps,‖ after ―zeppelins,‖ had orders to hover above the department and report back to 
Hague. 
 
Part Marine dress guard, part internal affairs bureau, and part political spies, these 
officers became a signature of Hague‘s rule at the Jersey City Department of Public 
Safety. First among their duties was the ceremonial: officers escorted Hague at every 
public appearance from 1913 until 1947. According to Bob Leach, the Zeps acted ―as a 
Palace Guard for Hague, surrounding him wherever he went, amid a hubbub of sirens, 
shining brass and jackbooted protocol.‖102 These ―Zeps,‖ in addition to their role in 
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adding pomp and circumstance to Hague‘s comings and goings, also became his eyes and 
ears within the department and helped solidify his power among the fearful rank-and-file. 
According to Senator Tumulty, the Zeps were roughly equivalent to ―a personal Gestapo 
of the type that Hitler had.‖ 103 
 
Hague used the martial drama of the uniformed forces to maximum effect. Mark Foster 
has described a 1914 Hague parade: ―Seeing their well dressed firemen and policemen 
along with several recently purchased fire trucks aroused pride in the citizens of Jersey 
City. After the parade, Hague made a speech in which he carefully outlined his 
achievements as commissioner, lest the voters forget the real reason for the parade. 
Though the other commissioners also spoke, it was clearly Hague‘s show.‖ 104 As 
McGerr has noted, parades were an important part of the political landscape in the 
nineteenth century, and in Jersey City they continued to play this role into the twentieth. 
As both political event and popular entertainment, parades had long been popular in 
Jersey City. One 1911 cartoon from the Journal shows the citizenry of Jersey City 
enthusiastically parading along while the politician on the sidelines was unable to catch 
any attention.
105
 With or without political content (and they were rarely without), Jersey 
City was a city of parades. 
 
Hague fused the excitement of the old Horseshoe rallies and parades with concrete 
evidence of his reforms – a well-disciplined force with modern equipment. He found a 
way to combine the popular activity with a direct illustration of his success as a reformer; 
such parades could be read with equal enthusiasm by all residents of Jersey City, whether 
from Horseshoe or Heights. 
 
In addition to his activities reforming the department, Hague took an active role in the act 
of policing itself, and the Journal frequently reported arrests credited directly to Hague. 
Articles with such headlines as ―Gangs in Autos Gathered in by Commissioner Hague‖106 
and ―Hague in Chase after a Driver,‖ elevated Hague‘s public image from crusading 
director of public safety to Jersey City‘s own supercop, roving the city to protect its 
citizens.
 107
 
 
One incident stands out in Hague‘s role as Jersey City‘s premier police officer. After 
attending church on Good Friday in 1916, Frank Kenny, a well-known Horseshoe 
resident, was gunned down in front of his young wife by Michael Rombollo, an Italian 
strikebreaker. Taking to the streets, the grief-stricken Irish community attacked any 
Italian close to the description of the killer.
108
 Hague, who had received his start in 
politics from Kenny‘s father, immediately pledged that he would bring the murderer to 
justice.
109
 When a hat dropped near the scene of the crime led to a Newark address, 
Hague personally rode along with police to apprehend the killer. While the police entered 
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the empty apartment, Hague noticed a suspicious man at a corner store. When the man 
ran out, Hague gave chase. Rombollo drew his revolver, but Hague leapt on him, 
disarmed him, and held him until the police regulars arrived to assist.
110
 
 
Hague‘s heroics proved a publicity bonanza. Even the oft-critical Hudson Observer 
raved, ―Director of Public Safety Frank Hague, who arrested the slayer in Newark, is the 
lion of the hour, and the members of his department, as well as the general public are 
loud in their praise of his bravery.‖111 But Hague got more out of his tussle with 
Rombollo than mere public adulation. In addition to the acclaim for his bravery, the 
incident afforded Hague a justification for his attempts to reform the police department. 
According to the Journal editors, ―It is rarely that the head of a police department 
personally goes after a dangerous criminal and has the enviable distinction of running 
down the offender. The bravery of Director Hague cannot be questioned. He has set a 
splendid example for the men of the Jersey City Police Department. He does not ask his 
men what he will not do himself.‖112 Before Rombollo‘s arrest, police leadership accused 
Hague of not being one of them, of not understanding the problems or culture of the 
force. Afterward, the credibility of those who challenged Hague‘s prerogative as the 
city‘s premier cop was shaken. 
 
Grumblers and naysayers suggested that Hague orchestrated the details of Rombollo‘s 
capture for his own glory; he had been similarly accused in his arrest of two burglars 
three years earlier.
113
 Whether or not he did so in either case remains unverifiable, but, 
even if both incidents are genuine evidence of Hague‘s bravery in the face of danger, it is 
significant that he actively sought the opportunity to grab headlines by personally 
engaging in police work. No evidence exists to suggest that Hague could have somehow 
rigged his fight with Rombollo. By riding along, however, Hague sought to include 
himself publicly in the arrest, even if he had not expected to take a starring role. Even 
when not directly involved in the action, Hague brought himself into the limelight on any 
major arrest, thus pioneering the modern practice of appearing by the bedside of any 
officer injured in the line of duty.
114
  
 
As director of public safety, Hague increasingly invoked securing the safety of women 
and children in his pleas for reform. Demanding a crackdown on ―rowdyism‖ and youth 
gangs, he insisted, ―without fear or favor I will continue to perform my duties and do my 
best to make Jersey City a safe place to live. Citizens, and especially women and 
children, must be free from insult and attack in public places.‖115  
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A pledge to protect families was fundamental to his crackdown on police drunkenness. 
When commissioner Brensinger objected to a strict fine Hague imposed on an officer 
with a family, Hague retorted, ―I agree with you that the punishment is severe… but we 
have to remember that this man was not thinking about his own children, nor about your 
children or my children when he failed to do his duty.‖116 
  
Hague‘s crusade to protect women is best exemplified by his attacks on the ―back room 
menace,‖ the practice of permitting women, not normally allowed in saloons, into secret 
back rooms. Shortly after taking up the post of director of public safety, Hague warned 
his officers, ―I am determined.. to get rid of back rooms attached to saloons, where men 
and women assemble and remain for hours drinking. Many young girls are ruined in this 
way, and I will not tolerate such a condition for a minute.‖117 He returned to this theme a 
year later when he warned, ―I do not want these conditions to exist in any precinct in the 
city and I feel that in certain sections of the city, women are being tolerated in saloons 
and are permitted to become intoxicated, having been seen to leave saloons at all 
hours.‖118 Hague promised to charge police captains not diligent in enforcement.119 
  
Hague moved to close firetrap movie theaters in a long and public crusade.
120
 ―I have not 
slept comfortably a single night since I received the report… on the condition of the 
moving picture show places in this city… After what I learned, I would feel a murderer if 
I had permitted some of the places to remain open a minute and any fatality had 
occurred.‖121 He went on to note that the imperative for closing was doubly strong 
because ―principally women and children… are the heaviest patrons of the picture 
shows.‖122 He moved to protect the honor of young women by limiting the number of 
licensed dance halls in the city and by keeping close police watch over the few he left 
open.
123
 
 
The defense of women and families was regarded as a positive reform in both of his 
constituencies. What Senator Tumulty described as Hague‘s ―Irishman‘s respect for 
womanhood‖ was in fact, a trait in Haig that held broad-based appeal. His protection of 
women was praised by the Irish Horseshoe residents as well as by the WASP reformers 
in Jersey City Heights.
 124
 
 
Hague‘s sweeping reforms as director of public safety did not go unchallenged. The 
Policemen‘s Benevolent Association (PBA), long a strong political force in Jersey City, 
sought to check Hague‘s reorganization of the police department. As with his earlier 
fights, Hague simply appealed to the public and characterized the battle in personal 
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terms. In an effort to seize control of internal affairs trials, Hague nearly came to blows 
with John Burke, the state president of the PBA.
125
 But when Jersey City Police Chief 
Monahan publicly derided Hague‘s leadership at a PBA dinner126, Hague had found his 
enemy. Hague suspended Monahan and brought him up on charges of insubordination.
127
 
Although Monahan was eventually acquitted and reinstated, he and Hague continued to 
vilify one another for several years. 
 
Returning to his dramatic threats to quit in his PBA fight, Hague shouted, ―I‘d sooner be 
out of the board than be insulted any longer by policemen on the street. It‘s an outrage 
and a disgrace to the city. The PBA are not going to run me. They have tried hard. They 
have called me everything.‖128 The fight with the PBA raged for years and became 
central in the commission government election in 1917. Hague attacked the association 
relentlessly, both on the stump and through the legislature in Trenton. For Hague, 
however, the two were seldom separate. In March 1917, after a long battle in the 
legislature over a bill to limit Hague‘s judicial power in the police department ended in a 
victory for Hague, the state president of the PBA conceded, ―The bill was killed by too 
much publicity.‖ 129 Just as with his previous fights, when he could not get his way 
Hague went to the public with the issue; he relied on his skill as an orator and a 
manipulator of public opinion to win the day. 
 
Hague sought to appropriate the symbolic assets of the PBA by suggesting to the PBA 
band that they rename themselves the ―Jersey City Police Band.‖130 The move to control 
the musicians illustrates the continuing value of entertainments as a political tool. Hague 
understood from the early days in the ‗Shoe that every performance by the band under the 
auspices of the PBA was a piece of political theater that directly challenged his authority. 
By controlling the band, he could co-opt its political value, both as symbol and as an 
effective tool to drum up a crowd. 
 
Once Hague had won the right to conduct police trials himself, he exploited this venue to 
publicize his department cleanup in dramatic fashion. He held trials of more than two 
hundred officers for various offenses.
131
 While trying former PBA head John Brennan, 
Hague insisted that he heard Brennan mumble a threat from the witness stand and flew 
into a rage detailed in dramatic form in the following morning‘s Journal.132 
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Rallying around the Hague Banner 
  
Hague‘s four-year term as commissioner was due to end in 1917. By late 1916, he began 
campaigning for the upcoming election. He continued to expand his appeal by linking 
himself to both Republican support
133
 and organized labor.
134
 With his popularity at its 
high-water mark, Hague cast his net wider than in any previous election. 
 
The 1917 election that actually made Hague mayor was largely anticlimactic. Popular for 
his reforms as commissioner of public safety and still riding the crest of praise from the 
dramatic end to the Kenny murder investigation, Hague‘s return to city hall was 
practically a foregone conclusion. The only significant opposition for control of the 
commission came from a badly weakened Wittpenn and from former Chief Monahan, 
who attacked Hague for his iron-fisted rule of the police department. 
 
Hague moved to block Monahan‘s candidacy for commissioner by arguing that running 
while still chief constituted a violation of the police manual. Hague portrayed the issue as 
an attempt to keep politics out of law enforcement. Said Hague, ―I have kept politics out 
of the police department and I am going to keep it out.‖135  
 
Although accusations of bossism plagued Hague‘s campaign, he countered them by 
insisting that the PBA was the real political machine.
136
 After the Rombollo affair, 
Monahan‘s accusations of Hague‘s failings in the police department fell on deaf ears. 
Full-page newspaper ads taken out Hague summarized the election as ―the P.B.A. vs. The 
People – Which Do You Want?‖137 The newspapers echoed Hague‘s characterization of 
the election. The Hudson Observer editorialized, ―the campaign against Hague was 
anticipated. The greatest of his many achievements for the public weal was reclaiming 
the police department and restoring its service to the people. The political clique within 
the department is trying to beat him.‖138 As in previous political battles, Hague 
dramatized the details of his fight for the public to watch and enjoy. The Hudson 
Observer characterized the election as ―Commissioner Hague‘s Manly Fight.‖139 In 
another editorial, the Observer again echoed Hague‘s presentation of his own manly 
battles: ―People like a fighter for a good cause; hence, the voters of Jersey City are 
rallying around the Hague banner. That‘s why he will win.‖140  
 
Hague did win. His broad call for support had been heard, as he polled well both in 
working-class ethnic and Protestant middle- and upper-class wards; Hague ran a close 
second in the citywide vote totals to A. Harry Moore.
141
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When the new commissioners met for the first time, they named Hague mayor, the post 
he occupied for the next thirty years.
142
 Although his tenure as mayor brought Hague 
national notoriety, it is his early career that shows the development of the political skills 
that catapulted him to power. Hague developed a combined appeal. By simultaneously 
targeting both his core ethnic and working-class constituency and the reform-minded, 
native-born middle class, Hague embraced two distinct political moralities. Hague used 
his dramatic flair for self-representation and self-lionization to ensure that every move 
would be watched by the public, and thus he dictated the terms of his own media 
portrayal. His constant molding of his public persona ensured that the public would view 
Hague in terms appropriate for every audience. In the words of a later mayor of Jersey 
City, ―Because he made good copy, the Journal began to hang on every move made by 
Hague.‖143 
 
It will be impossible for Jersey City to forget the Hague years. The city is dotted with 
buildings and monuments erected during his mayoralty, including the massive Jersey City 
Medical Center that continues to dominate the skyline. But just as Jersey City bears the 
physical legacy of Frank Hague‘s reign, so too do its politics. Hague etched his legacy on 
the political landscape of Jersey City. He reshaped both the substance and symbols of the 
political process. By translating reform politics into the theatrical style of Horseshoe 
political pageantry, Hague forged a single political language that spoke to all of the city.  
 
Hague personalized every political battle and dramatized even mundane and abstract 
policy as a vivid struggle between men. Every issue became translated into a political 
boxing match – occasionally literally – and each issue became of test of Hague‘s 
manhood. Hague lifted tropes of manhood and personal struggle from the ethnic politics 
of his youth and applied them to the issues that excited middle-class Progressives. Over 
the course of his early career, Hague developed a political style that was decipherable to 
both the personalized ethics of the Horseshoe and the depersonalized ―good government‖ 
ideology of Jersey City Heights. 
 
Although in later years Hague was frequently thwarted in attempts to expand his power 
beyond New Jersey‘s borders, his legacy – and the lessons to be drawn from it – are writ 
large on the American political landscape. Often described as an archetype of the political 
boss, Hague‘s rise affords scholars a window into the cultural processes necessary for 
such a system to develop. Even more important, the sort of cross-ethnic and cross-class 
coalition building Frank Hague pioneered remains a critical part of today‘s urban political 
landscape. The lessons of Frank Hague‘s early career are as resonant at the beginning of 
the twenty-first century as they were at the dawn of the twentieth. 
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